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ABSTRACT 
It is common to muse over the perils of thinking like an economist. There is, we are told, something 
missing when we only weigh the costs and benefits of some options before us, and then choose the 
one that will lead to the greatest utility. Such a view is now commonplace in philosophy curriculums, 
and it has been defended, for example, by Michael Sandel, Debra Satz, and Elizabeth Anderson. This 
paper, conversely, explains how scholars regularly underestimate the extent to which economics 
applies to their viewpoint, and how the field of economics is frequently portrayed in a misleading 
way. It will make clear the perils of not thinking like an economist, especially for philosophers, and it 
will right the caricatures we can too often hear about economists. Both philosophers and economists 
think about the same issue, namely the question of value. Economics, however, examines the 
consequences of value judgments, and as such it is an essential feature of any practical proposition 
about value in society. 
Keywords: Economic Man, Ethics, Market Capitalism, Morality, Role of Economics 
RESUME 
Il est courant de songer aux périls de penser comme un économiste. On nous dit qu'il nous manque 
quelque chose lorsque nous évaluons seulement les coûts et les avantages de certaines options avant de 
choisir celle qui sera la plus utile. Une telle vision est maintenant courante dans les programmes de 
philosophie, et elle a été défendue, par exemple, par Michael Sandel, Debra Satz et Elizabeth 
Anderson. Cet article, à l'inverse, explique comment les chercheurs sous-estiment régulièrement la 
mesure dans laquelle l'économie s'applique à leur point de vue, et comment le champ de l'économie est 
souvent présenté de manière trompeuse. Il mettra en lumière les périls de ne pas penser comme un 
économiste, surtout pour les philosophes, et il corrigera les caricatures que l'on entend trop souvent à 
propos des économistes. Les philosophes comme les économistes s’interrogent sur la même question, à 
savoir la question de la valeur. L'économie, cependant, examine les conséquences des jugements de 
valeur et, en tant que telle, elle constitue une caractéristique essentielle de toute proposition pratique 
sur la valeur dans la société. 
Mots-clés : Homme économique, éthique, capitalisme de marché, moralité, rôle de l’économie 
 
JEL Classification: A11, A12, A13 
 
Thinking like an economist 
2 
 
1. THE PERILS OF THINKING LIKE AN ECONOMIST ARE MOSTLY FICTITIOUS 
“I have been increasingly moved to wonder”, once said Frank Knight (1951: 2), “whether 
my job is a job or a racket, whether economists, and particularly economic theorists, may not 
be in a position that Cicero, citing Cato, ascribed to the augurs of Rome”. Similarly, “Later 
in life”, recounted Jacob Viner (1963: 1), Napoleon “claimed that he had always believed 
that if an empire were made of granite the ideas of economists, if listened to, would suffice 
to reduce it to dust.” It is common to muse over the perils of thinking like an economist. 
There is, we are told, something missing when we only weigh the costs and benefits of some 
options before us, and then choose the one that will lead to the greatest utility. Such a view is 
now commonplace in philosophy curriculums, and it has been defended, for example, by 
Michael Sandel, Debra Satz, and Elizabeth Anderson. This paper, conversely, explains how 
scholars regularly underestimate the extent to which economics applies to their viewpoint, 
and how the field of economics is frequently portrayed in a misleading way. It will make 
clear the perils of not thinking like an economist, especially for philosophers, and it will right 
the caricatures we can too often hear about economists. 
The most obvious objection to the presumed perils of thinking like an economist would be to 
say that there is no one way to think like an economist. One may remember the joke saying 
that economics is the only field in which two people can share a Nobel Prize for defending 
opposing things, like Friedrich Hayek and Gunnar Myrdal did in 1974. But the objection 
usually runs deeper. According to Sandel (2013a: 122), economics presents itself as a 
“value-free science”, which “does not pass judgment on how income should be distributed or 
how this or that good should be valued.” Even though there are different economic 
approaches, we could then think that they all refuse to engage with morality. They refuse to 
pass value judgments. There is an ethics of “expediency”, of “calculation”, as Viner noted 
(1963: 8f, 13), in the field of economics. Hence, “Political economy”, said Lord John Russell 
in 1821, “is an awful thing.” Likewise, Walter Bagehot remarked that “no real Englishman in 
his secret soul was ever sorry for the death of a political economist; he is much more likely 
to be sorry for his life.” While such thoughts are not especially nuanced, they are nonetheless 
indicative of a widespread sentiment – we should not think like economists. 
Economics, Lionel Robbins championed (1932: 132), must be dissociated from ethics. 
“Unfortunately it does not seem logically possible to associate the two studies in any form 
but mere juxtaposition. Economics deals with ascertainable facts; ethics with valuations and 
obligations.” Not so, this paper will argue. Both philosophers and economists think about the 
same issue, namely the question of value in society. The difference, then, is not one of 
object, but mainly one of method. These professions will favour different means to assess 
value in society, which, naturally, will lead them to different conclusions. Of course, 
economists, as Gregory Mankiw admits (2006: 29), “like to strike the pose of a scientist.” 
Economics is a science, unlike ethics. But the perennial distinction between art and science 
does not deter the critics, and we can still hear that something is rotten in economics 
departments. This is made even more problematic by the fact that economics, according to 
Sandel (2013b: 6), has become an “imperial domain”, which “increasingly governs the 
whole of life.” Hence, there is a risk that philosophers will become ever more refractory to 
the ideas of their peers, the economists, which, in turn, will lead to misunderstandings. 
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Though there are serious limitations to the economic field of study, there are perils to not 
think like an economist. Economics examines the consequences of value judgments, and as 
such it is an essential feature of any practical proposition, or at least it should be. This paper 
examines three standard critiques of political economy. First, (§2) it will debunk the myth of 
the “economic man”, which philosophers often criticize. Second, (§3) it will right the 
misrepresentations of the utilitarian tilt of economics, which are also running rampant. Third, 
(§4) it will show why it is wrong to criticize economists for disregarding the “social 
embeddedness” of markets, as Satz did. In the end, (§5) the objective of this paper is to set 
the record straight, and show how political economy is a moral science, although perhaps not 
in a way most of its critics would approve. That economics is a moral science has already 
been defended, for example, by Lord Keynes, Frank Knight, Paul Samuelson, and Anthony 
Atkinson, but it may need some additional clarifications. One of the main objectives of 
political economy, like in philosophy, is to assess value in society, though political 
economists do so through policy proposals, unlike in philosophy. 
2. THE PROBLEM OF THE ECONOMIC MAN – RATIONALITY IS FOR OTHER 
PEOPLE 
Let us begin with the question of the economic man, the infamous “homo economicus” – a 
narrowly self-interested agent who would go to any length to maximize his utility, or so we 
are told. If economics is the science which purports to study such a man, one can see why it 
is on shaky moral grounds. “Even to-day”, said Friedrich Hayek (1933: 124), “it is regarded 
almost as a sign of moral depravity if the economist finds anything to marvel at in his 
science”, to which he added, “And he is bitterly reproached if he does not emphasise, at 
every stage of his analysis, how much he regrets that his insight into the order of things 
makes it less easy to change them whenever we please.” Unlike the law which is set to 
frustrate the “bad man”, according to Oliver Wendell Holmes (1997: 993), economics fully 
embraces the “egoistic man”. It celebrates his egoism. The first critique, then, would go as 
follows: 
(1) The egoism critique – i.e. economics relies on the assumption that people are 
selfish and egoistic. “Every extension of the market”, said Anderson (1993: 145), 
“thus represents an extension of the domain of egoism”, and the political economist, 
we could add, encourages such a distorted understanding of human nature. 
For example, “In all domain of life,” said Sandel about economics (2013b: 48), “human 
behavior can be explained by assuming that people decide what to do by weighing the costs 
and benefits of the options before them and choosing the one they believe will give them the 
greatest welfare, or utility.” Hence, it is thought, economics offers us a unidimensional view 
of human nature – the desire for gain primes, and the more noble sentiments falter. We see 
people driven by their desires, independent of their relations to their loved ones, and ignoring 
the moral features that make them humans. Everything becomes a question of costs and 
benefits. If we are to ameliorate society, Sandel added (2013b: 76), “it is simply a matter of 
designing the right incentive structure”, which misses the point that “norms matter.” 
There are two problems with such a critique – first, the economic man is not as selfish as he 
is often said to be, and, second, he is but an assumption, and philosophers often use similar 
thought experiments. Alfred Marshall rightly explained the first point as follows: 




“But ethical forces are among those of which the economist has to take account. 
Attempts have indeed been made to construct an abstract science with regard to the 
actions of an ‘economic man,’ who is under no ethical influences and who pursues 
pecuniary gain warily and energetically, but mechanically and selfishly. But they 
have not been successful, nor even thoroughly carried out. For they have never really 
treated the economic man as perfectly selfish”. (1930: vi) 
First, then, there is a tendency to exaggerate how the economic man is under no ethical 
influences. The economic man, Satz criticized (2010: 29), “may be out only for himself, but 
he must not generally steal, lie, cheat, or murder in order to maximize his gains”. Fair 
enough, we could say, but the economic man does not do any such thing. He is a decent 
fellow, remarkably well behaved. Moreover, the economic man is not “out only for himself”. 
As Marshall noted, it is assumed that such a man will care for his family, which is more that 
can be said of many people. The assumed psychology of the economic man is also bound to 
his social environment. He does not live in a state of “continual fear, and danger of violent 
death”, nor is his life “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”, following Thomas Hobbes 
(I.xiii.9, 2008: 84). His life is somewhat cozy, and his psychology, though unsatisfactory, is 
not far-fetched. “In fact,” said Viner (1917: 248), “it may almost be said that the ‘economic 
man’ was an actual Englishman of the commercial world.” Hence, the economic man is not 
purely egoistic, nor does he care only for himself. He is somewhat ordinary, and he operates 
in accordance with some social standard, say one we could find in the United States today. 
Second, it is important to note that the instrumental rationality of the economic man does not 
explain human behaviour for the economist. The objective is rather predictive, or forward-
looking if you will. Most economists are concerned with ends, not motives. We do not know 
why people act the way they do, and, of course, economists are aware that the complexity of 
human psychology cannot conform to such an “arbitrary definition of man” as the economic 
man. “Political economy, therefore,” John Stuart Mill explained (1877: 144), “reasons from 
assumed premises––from premises which might be totally without foundation in fact, and 
which are not pretended to be universally in accordance with it.” In other words, aware of its 
limitations, economics uses such an “assumed psychology” so as to reach interesting 
conclusions. But we remain aware that reality is more complex than the economic man 
allows. “No mathematician”, said Mill (1877: 145), “ever thought that his definition of a line 
corresponded to an actual line.” The economist is no different. Though self-interest may 
have been the foundation of economics at the end of the nineteenth century, with, say, 
William Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger, and Léon Walras, we must not underestimate the 
extent to which morality has always played a central role in economics. We are quite aware 
that the economic man is unlike any real human being. 
It would be a mistake to understand economic theory through the imagined attributes of the 
economic man. For example, Anderson (1993: 164) criticizes economists like Friedrich 
Hayek or Milton Friedman by saying that they suppose that “individuals are self-sufficient in 
their capacities to exercise freedom and to form and express their values, independent of 
their relations to others.” They did no such thing – this is an attribute of the economic man, 
but it does not define their value theory. Friedman (2002: 12), for instance, took the family 
as the relevant subject of inquiries into the structures of market capitalism. Methodological 
individualism, a key feature of neoclassical economics, does not imply individualism as a 
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moral stance, nor, of course, ethical egoism. More importantly, however, there is a 
distinction between actual people and the hypothetical models economists commonly use. 
Consider the following case, which David Friedman recounts to illustrate the distinction. 
“One summer, a colleague asked me why I had not bought a parking permit. I 
replied that not having a convenient place to park made me more likely to ride my 
bike. He accused me of inconsistency. As a believer in rationality, I should be able 
to make the correct choice between sloth and exercise without first rigging the game. 
My response was that rationality is an assumption I make about other people. I know 
myself well enough to allow for the consequences of my own irrationality. But for 
the vast mass of my fellow humans, about whom I know very little, rationality is the 
best predictive assumption available.” (1996: 5) 
The key point is that although economics is built on the assumption of rationality, it is a 
mere assumption. We do not know enough about other people, and therefore we use the 
economic man, mindful, evidently, that he is unlike actual people. Perhaps the most 
implausible attribute of the economic man, we could add, is not his selfishness, but rather his 
unwavering rationality. According to Mill (1877: 137), the economic man is “a being who 
desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging of the comparative efficacy of 
means for obtaining that end.” Today, as Gary Becker explained (1962: 1), economic theory 
no longer assumes the hedonistic rationale or the unrealistic psychology of the economic 
man. It simply assumes “consistent maximization of a well-ordered function”, say a utility or 
profit function. The philosopher could still object to such a utilitarian philosophy. But the 
function does not have to be utility, and economists often favour a welfare function, which, 
as we will see, is why many of the caricatures of economics are just out of place. 
The economic man is a convenient tool. The problem is that it has been elevated to a full-
fledged economic theory by its critics. Suddenly, the device became a sign of what is 
variously referred to as “market-oriented thinking”, “market reasoning”, or “economic 
thinking”. It is no such thing. The economic man is rather a simple case of what Herbert 
Simon called “substantive rationality” (1986: S210), for which rationality is viewed in terms 
of the choices it produces, and which does not speak about the content of goals and values. 
There is nothing extraordinary or cold-hearted with such a reasoning, and therefore one can 
wonder why Karl Polanyi (2001: 46) saw fit to criticize the economic man by saying that, 
“Adam Smith’s suggestions about economic psychology of early man were as false as 
Rousseau’s were on the political psychology of the savage.” As you would expect, “the 
propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another”, which Smith described 
(1776: I.ii.1), is but a simplification of human psychology, which is not to be taken literally. 
The assumption of substantive rationality has also been used by contractualist theorists. For 
example, the economic man is not unlike the original position defended by John Rawls 
(1999: 16), in which people are stripped of their particular inclinations, aspirations, and 
conceptions of the good when deliberating about principles of justice. Both are thought 
experiments that use an assumed psychology to think about the background institutions of 
society. However, whereas Rawls’s veil of ignorance is celebrated, and justifiably so, the 
economic man is regularly vilified. An intellectual device that draws no ire in philosophy 
suddenly becomes the proof of the economist’s heartlessness and ethics of “expediency”. 
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Unlike people under the veil of ignorance, moreover, the economic man has a conception of 
the good – one in line with that of his contemporaries. Most contractualist theorists have 
made a similar assumption. For example, Thomas Hobbes assumed the psychology of the 
Englishman after the Civil War, John Locke the Whigs around the Glorious Revolution, and 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau the Frenchman before the French Revolution. Economists are no 
different. Today, they assume the psychology of, say, the average American consumer. We 
could assume a different psychology – maybe a civic one like Michael Sandel (1996), or a 
socialist one after Gerald Cohen (2000: 128ff, 142ff). But doing so would not permit us to 
recommend policies to make people better-off in our society – and making such welfare 
judgements, as the next section will show, is what grounds economics in ethics. 
3. THE PROBLEM OF WANT-SATISFACTION – WELFARE IS AN ETHICAL 
CONCEPT  
Let us now consider another question. The expertise of the economist, we are told, does not 
and perhaps cannot say why want-satisfaction matters. “Why maximize social utility? Most 
economists”, said Sandel (2013b: 88), “either ignore this question or fall back on some 
version of utilitarian moral philosophy.” Economics has a purpose, but this purpose, we 
could think, stands unjustified. It may even be corrosive, such that it distracts us in our 
pursuit of some civic values. We would then face what Satz calls a “noxious market”, which 
is only set to maximize welfare, in spite of the moral issues we face. According to Satz 
(2010: 92), hence, “economic theory is inherently imperialistic about the scope of the 
market”, such that “the solution to market failure is often taken to consist in the enlargement 
of the scope of the market.” Economics becomes driven by hedonism, which eats away the 
ethical character of our market societies, or, at least, so have argued many philosophers: 
(2) The utilitarianism critique – i.e. political economy endorses “provisional 
utilitarianism”, as Robbins would say (1938: 635), which makes it rather 
unconcerned with moral questions. It “counts each man as one, and, on that 
assumption, asks which way lies the greatest happiness”, following Jeremy 
Bentham. 
The poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1917: 433) summarized the idea well enough – “It is this 
accursed practice of ever considering only what seems expedient for the occasion, disjoined 
from all principle or enlarged systems of action, of never listening to the true and unerring 
impulses of our better nature, which has led the colder-hearted men to the study of political 
economy.” This section, conversely, shows why economics is a moral science. 
Utilitarianism, there is no denying, has influenced numerous prominent economists. 
Economics, said Marshall (1930: 1), “examines that part of individual and social action 
which is most closely connected with the attainment and with the use of the material 
requisites of wellbeing.” Therefore, we could think that economics obsessively pursues 
wellbeing or utility. Following Satz (2010: 34), we could also think that “most economists 
purport to employ a division of labor whereby they explain only efficiency while others 
worry about ethics.” Not so. It is common to criticize economists as if they endorsed the 
maxim “de gustibus non est disputandum”, that is, “in matters of taste, there can be no 
disputes”. Such a utilitarian view, we are told by Sandel and Satz, forces the economist to 
disregard the moral foundations of our society as well as the moral character of the goods 
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being traded. Valuation then simply becomes a matter of putting a price on everything, 
including love. 
According to Sandel (2013b: 200), economists have a tendency to commodify everything, 
which leads to what he calls “rampant commercialization.” Such a tendency, however, is 
nothing but a professional quirk. Economists are not blind to the moral character of the 
goods and services they study. One can expect that economists will commodify things, even 
love as Sandel notes (2013b: 127-30), not because they think of such things as commodities, 
but because it makes it easier to discuss them. Likewise, one should not be surprised that 
political scientists will say that everything is a question of power, even marriages, or that 
lawyers will immediately shift a discussion about love toward the issue of prenuptial 
agreements. 
As Viner noted (1963: 15), there used to be a term to signify the “belief in the possibility of 
and zeal for extending measurement to all phenomena.” “Pantometry”, as it was known, was 
a scheme for universal measurement. Such a proposal, we could think, represents one peril of 
thinking like an economist. There are some things that are heterogeneous, or non-comparable 
if you will. For example, Samuel T. Coleridge mocked those who would find similarities 
between one’s love for one’s wife and one’s passion for roast beef. Yet such is a common 
practice today. In economics, an indifference curve represents in geometrical terms points 
where consumers have no preference between, say, love and roast beef. Such a view may be 
troubling to many critics of economics, but it should not. A professional quirk is not 
necessarily a bias, and it should not epitomize a field of study. 
More importantly, however, the issue of valuation in economics is much more complex than 
one can be led to believe. Welfare is an ethical concept. Such a point has been a leitmotiv of 
the critiques of, say, Sandel and Satz, but it had already been explained by Frank Knight, one 
of the founders of the Chicago School of economics. The first function of an economic 
system, said Knight (1935: 42), is to establish a value scale. “It is impossible to form any 
concept of ‘social efficiency’ in the absence of some general measure of value.” The alleged 
naivety of economists has greatly been exaggerated regarding this function. 
Economists are well aware of the “mere addition paradox” Derek Parfit introduced 
(1987: 419-41), and accordingly they do not only look for ways to maximize aggregate 
welfare while leaving most poor people behind. We have come a long way since the 
Benthamite social welfare function, which only considers the sum of individual incomes. 
Most economists are rather concerned with social welfare functions guided by some values, 
say the separateness of persons, like the Bergson-Samuelson individualist welfare function 
W[U1, U2, U3, …]. If one is to use a given value scale, be it welfare, utility, or simply X, one 
must indeed consider a range of features, behind which there will be a theory of justice. In 
reality, as Anthony Atkinson noted (2009: 796), economists will examine the following 
questions: 
(i) Diversity – i.e. “different people hold different sets of values”, such that liberty 
may be more important for one than social justice, and vice versa for another.  
(ii) Plurality – i.e. “a single person may bring to bear more than one set of welfare 
criteria”, such that we must balance, say, greatest happiness with liberty. 
As soon as the information content of individual preferences is broad enough to include 
interpersonally comparable cardinal welfare functions, to use Sen’s words (1997: 15), our 
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value scale must consider some distributive features, forcing us to engage with political 
theory: 
(iii) Intertemporal distribution – i.e. different generations have differing interests, 
and therefore we must consider the rate at which future utility is discounted. 
(iv) Interpersonal distribution – i.e. different people have conflicting interests, and 
therefore we must also consider the question of distributive justice. 
It is not clear exactly how economists have failed to recognize the ethical dimensions of such 
questions. One can often hear that these are questions which economists are not even willing 
to discuss, and yet they are fairly common in political economy. There are many ways in 
which what Aristotle called “eudaimonia”, namely “happiness” or “welfare”, can be 
understood, and indeed there are many ways in which it has been understood by economists. 
We do not all blindly follow Bentham. For example, Sen proposed the capabilities approach, 
which is approximated by the Human Development Index that he introduced in 1990 with 
Mahbub ul Haq. Regarding inequality, we often use the Gini coefficient, or the Atkinson 
index. If “economics is what economists do”, as Viner said, then there can be little doubt that 
economics is a moral science, if only because economists will frequently engage with moral 
issues. Furthermore, this tendency to engage with moral issues sheds light on the morality of 
the economic man. Knight noted that our understanding of such a man holds only under a 
certain social background. 
“We can say that a man will in general prefer a large quantity of wealth to a smaller 
(the principal trait of the economic man) because in the statement the term ‘wealth’ 
has no definite concrete meaning; it is merely an abstract term covering everything 
which men do actually (provisionally) want.” (1922: 475f) 
In choosing a given maximand, then, the economist is engaging with the wants of his or her 
contemporaries. However, given the diversity and plurality of wants, the maximand the 
economist chooses will also reflect some values, even more so if the economist recommends 
some policies to maximize it. If one were to analyse the maximand most commonly used by 
economists, one would find mostly the same values that philosophers frequently praise – of 
course, there would be growth, but also employment, sustainability, capabilities, wellbeing, 
social inclusion, flourishing, as well as, obviously, equality. Sometimes, the values behind 
the maximand can be obvious, like in the following case: 
“When asked what was the most useful item of domestic property,” Cato Censorius, 
a famous Roman senator known for his conservatism, “replied: ‘Good grazing.’ And 
what was the next best? ‘Adequate grazing.’ And the third best? ‘Poor grazing.’ And 
the fourth? ‘Ploughing.’ When the questioner asked ‘How about money-lending?’, 
Cato answered: ‘How about murdering someone?’” (Cicero, De Officiis (On 
Obligations), 2.89) 
Cato the Elder thought that homeowners should maximize grassland suitable for pasturage 
on their property, and he made quite clear his disdain for what the Greeks called 
“chrematistics”. The ordering of values here is limpid. For modern economists, the ordering 
may not be so obvious. Consequently, the economist could be thought to hold a similarly 
stubborn view as Cato Censorius – more utility is better than less, and let us stay away from 
moral considerations, especially egalitarian or civic ones. This is incorrect. A few names of 
famous economists should suffice to dispel such a thought – John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, 
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Lord Keynes, Amartya Sen, and Anthony Atkinson were all sincerely concerned with 
equality, which is echoed in the phenomena they chose to study. Conversely, Adam Smith, 
Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, and Milton Friedman were more concerned with 
individual freedom, which ranked before any utility concern. 
It is true that James Buchanan criticized the Knightian model by saying that the value scales 
economists establish are not necessarily social value scales. “The use of the standard of 
measurement”, said Buchanan (1987: 64), “does not carry any normative implication relating 
to maximization or minimization.” This is correct – as David Hume taught us, we should not 
derive “ought” propositions from “is” propositions. But most economists, Buchanan 
included, do make recommendations about the optimal policy, or about the welfare 
consequences of a given policy. In doing so, they make welfare statements, as Atkinson 
noted (2009: 794). That is, the value scale we use can exist as an independent instrument of 
economic science – such that we do not prescribe that the criterion identified by the scalar 
must be maximized. However, economists make such recommendations on a daily basis. The 
fact is that economists put forward welfare judgments. They regularly propose institutional 
changes to increase social welfare – a question which we must now examine. 
4. THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL STANDARDS – SHOULD YOU GO KILL 
WALRUSES? 
“But the age of chivalry is gone.”, said Edmund Burke (2009: 76), “That of sophisters, 
oeconomists, and calculators, has succeeded; and the glory of Europe is extinguished for 
ever.” Economists, it is often thought, offer us an unsophisticated view of society – bland 
and devoid of its more noble moral qualities. Let us discuss this other stigma attached to 
economic thinking. According to Anderson (1993: 145), norms structuring market relations 
have five main features – they are “impersonal, egoistic, exclusive, want-regarding, and 
oriented to ‘exit’ rather than ‘voice’.” A closer examination would reveal that markets are 
defined by none of these unflattering features, or, at least, that these are incidental features at 
best, not inherent ones. But let us examine the more fundamental issue. It is thought that 
economists will refuse to question the organizational principles of markets. They will explain 
market functioning, while taking for granted the institutions that permit markets to exist. The 
charge against economists is one of failing to be critical of our institutions: 
(3) The social embeddedness critique – i.e. modern economists are oblivious to the 
social embeddedness of markets, that is, they fail to see how markets rests on 
pervasive principles of social organization, which leave their mark on the people, the 
goods and services being traded, as well as on society as a whole. 
Such a critique has been defended by both Sandel and Satz. For example, “Economists”, said 
Sandel (2013a: 128), “often assume that markets are inert, that they do not touch or taint the 
goods they regulate.” Likewise, Satz establishes a distinction between the classical political 
economists, like Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx, and modern economists. She 
praises the classical economists for they emphasized the “social embeddedness” of markets. 
That is, the market “shapes our differing and thus unequal preferences, interests, and 
capacities”, as Smith explained by looking at the division of labour. This intuition, says Satz 
(2010: 39, 46), “has been lost.” Not so – it is an essential feature of neoclassical economics. 
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This third critique rests on a straw man. The intuition about the social embeddedness of 
markets has never been lost. We can find it in the new institutional economics movement, 
represented by Ronald Coase, Douglass North, Elinor Ostrom, and Oliver Williamson. The 
same goes for the Chicago School of economics, with, say, Frank Knight, George Stigler, 
and Milton Friedman, and for the Austrian School with Carl Menger, Ludwig von Mises, and 
Friedrich Hayek. Not only has such an intuition lived on, but it is now also a staple of 
economic thinking. No economic doctrine is meaningful except with reference to a given 
institutional and social context. Satz (2010: 41) is right to praise Smith for his intuition that 
the market is a revolutionary form of social organization, but she is wrong to add that such 
an intuition has been “largely ignored.” The Nobel lectures of Hayek, Buchanan, Ostrom, 
Coase, North, as well as Vernon Smith all furthered such a Smithean intuition. 
Whereas the Theory of Moral Sentiments advanced the “doctrine of an order of nature 
designed and guided by a benevolent God”, in the Wealth of Nations Smith abandoned such 
an idea. Therefore, as Viner explained (1927: 208), Smith was then “free to find defects in 
the order of nature without casting reflections on the workmanship of its Author.” This is 
indeed the fundamental intuition of the Smithean view of markets – the market is a principle 
of social organization that is conductive to individual freedom, though it is far from a perfect 
one. It is imbued with flaws, and therefore we should be wary of markets, for example, 
Smith argued (1776: I.x.ii.61), when they favour the “masters” against the “workmen.” Most 
economists have embraced this intuition. They criticize markets when appropriate, and do 
not shy away from exploring other organizational principles. Laissez faire is dead. 
It is true that some economists have not embraced all the ethical conclusions one could reach 
from this more critical understanding of economics. One important conclusion, of course, is 
that economics is a moral science. When economists propose different rules of organization, 
they must engage with individual preferences and distributional quandaries. Whereas it was 
obvious for Hayek that every practical conclusion in economics is based on fundamental 
ethical postulates (1933: 122), other equally renowned economists have disagreed. For 
instance, the “ethical orientation” of political economy, said Carl Menger (1985: 235-7), is 
“devoid of any deeper meaning”, “a confusion in thought”, “a residue of a philosophy that 
comes from antiquity”, and “a lamentable crutch for scientific insufficiency.” One may 
disagree with Menger, and indeed one should, I would argue. But that is not to say that he or 
other economists were unaware of the social embeddedness of markets, like Satz said. 
The fact is that few lessons have permeated economics as much as what could be called the 
“social embeddedness of markets”. Yet, according to Satz (2010: 45), “contemporary 
economic theory tends to view a person’s preferences and capacities as given inputs into an 
economy”. Likewise, Sandel (2013b: 125) maintains that the first tenet of “market faith” is 
that “commercializing an activity doesn’t change it.” Of course, it will change it, we could 
say, and, similarly, people’s preferences and capacities are outputs of a given economic 
system. It is easy to criticize economists by attributing them views which they have not 
advanced. But it only creates an illusionary victory. Neoclassical economics is quite aware 
that the organizational principles of markets will affect the coordination of individual efforts 
in society, as well as the direction of these efforts themselves. A given system of property 
rights or contract law, for example, will affect the preferences and the opportunities of the 
people. This was well understood by both Hayek (1980: 107-18) and Friedman (2002: 162), 
and today it is commonplace in behavioural economics, say with the concept of nudge. 
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Consider child labour. “Some economists and policy advisors”, says Satz (2010: 4), “have 
argued that banning child labor is a mistake because some families rely for their survival on 
the labor of their children. At the same time many believe that protecting young children 
from working is a moral requirement.” This is a false dichotomy. Satz presents the issue as 
though economists do not think that protecting children is a moral requirement as well. 
The economic argument for child labour is not absolute, nor does it take for granted the 
decision of parents to put to work their children. It is most probably preceded by a 
sufficientarian clause saying that poor people should have enough to survive. They should 
also have, one could add, a reasonable prospect of a good life. For many poor people, 
however, this is only attainable if their young children go to work. Such an argument, 
therefore, reminds us that it would be a mistake to prohibit child labour without addressing 
the background causes of such practice. In other words, banning child labour is inadvisable, 
according to some economists, not because some poor families rely for their survival on such 
labour, but because it does not address a third alternative – banning child labour plus 
enacting policies to address the problems of extreme poverty. 
The preference of some parents to send their children to work will not be a simple input for 
the economist, as Satz contends. It is rather the effect of some market institutions, which do 
not present some poor people with the same opportunity structure as more fortuned people. 
This was Smith’s intuition. “The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between 
a philosopher and a common street porter, for example,” said Smith (1776: I.ii.4), “seems to 
arise not so much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education.” Satz quotes that 
passage, and yet fails to see how economists today are in line with Smith. The economic 
argument for child labour does not so much defend the morality of the practice, nor does it 
take it as a simple input. Rather it makes clear the dilemma we face – our moral 
condemnation of child labour leads to additional sufferings for some poor people. Before 
banning child labour we should revise the market structure that led to the practice. 
If anything, we could say, the difference between a philosopher and an economist arises not 
so much from the nature of their investigation, as from their method to address value in 
society. Philosophers tend to propose absolute or lexically ordered schemes of value. 
Political economists, conversely, will most likely have to consider the trade-offs between 
different changes in policy. There is nothing especially repugnant with the latter method. 
“An organized system”, said Knight, “must operate in accordance with a social 
standard. This standard will of course be related in some way to the values of the 
individuals making up the society, but it cannot be merely identical with them; it 
presupposes some process of organizing the various individual interests, weighing 
them against each other and adjudicating conflicts among them.” (1935: 42) 
The economist, then, will often have to adjudicate conflicts between different values, say 
between individual liberty and sufficientarianism. Therein lies the ethical character of 
economics. If maximum wealth could be reached by reinstating slavery, the political 
economist, of course, would not advocate such an outrageous policy. Economists operate 
within the bounds of some ethical standards, normally well-matched to those in place. 
Hence, Satz and Sandel could perhaps criticize the standards economists use. Liberty 
frequently comes first for neoclassical economists, while the values of employment or 
equality may be more noticeable in, say, Keynesian economics. Maybe we should have a 
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different standard to guide us through the trade-offs we encounter. However, that is not to 
say that political economy is “an awful thing” – nor that economic reasoning is “naïve”. 
Consider the case of people who pay to shoot a walrus, which Sandel uses to great effect. In 
Canada, walruses have been decimated, and thus they cannot be hunted anymore, except for 
aboriginal subsistence. In the 1990s, the Canadian government allowed Inuit people to trade 
their walrus quota, thus allowing individuals to pay, about $6,500, for the licence of killing a 
walrus under Inuit supervision – a morally dubious activity, certainly. “But from the 
standpoint of market reasoning,” says Sandel (2013a: 131), “there is much to be said for 
allowing the Inuit to sell their right to shoot a certain number of walruses.” “It makes some 
people better off without making anyone worse off.” This case, however, is not indicative of 
“market reasoning”, as Sandel says, nor is it clear that it should be allowed. 
There are two problems. First, making at least one person better-off without making anyone 
worse-off is not “market reasoning”, or “economic reasoning”. It is rather Pareto superiority, 
that is, a change that benefits someone and injures no one. But in a market society, of course, 
there will never be a change in policy that will produce only benefits and no costs. If 
political economists were to recommend only Pareto superior changes in policy, then they 
would never make any recommendation. Normally, one will rather favour a theory of 
efficiency, following Alfred Marshall, which is concerned with net gains – not with some 
gain with no loss (Friedman, 2000: 25). The fact that there will always be a losing party in 
political economy is precisely what makes it so interesting. As soon as we get past cases in 
which there are only two persons trading, some people will be made worse-off, which is why 
economics is tied to political theory, and corporate governance to ethics. 
Second, and more importantly, efficiency will have to be balanced with other values, as we 
have shown, and therefore economic reasoning is much more complex than transpires in the 
case of shooting walruses. It is not obvious that we should always pursue efficiency, and, 
when we do, we should not do so mindlessly. Reducing the gender gap, we could say, is 
worth at least a few units of efficiency. Saving walruses in Canada may be worth causing 
some discomfort to eager hunters. Political economists are aware of such dilemmas, and our 
understandings of markets are permeated with similar questions.  
5. THE PERILS OF NOT THINKING LIKE AN ECONOMIST ARE QUITE REAL 
If economics, as we can be led to believe, is a science moved by an ethics of expediency, 
which refuses to even engage with current moral debates, then we can understand why so 
many philosophers are wary of such a field of study. Likewise, if one were to take for 
granted the ways in which economists are often portrayed by their critics, one could be 
tempted, following Charles Dickens (1854: 558), to say that, “Political economy is a mere 
skeleton unless it has a little human covering, and filling out, a little human bloom upon it 
and a little human warmth in it.” The problem, however, is that these are mere caricatures.  
We should not be so concerned with the perils of thinking like an economist, as rather with 
the perils of thinking like a straw man economist. But that is an underwhelming conclusion. 
Let me now conclude with a few thoughts to explain why the profession of economist is so 
often mischaracterized by some critics, almost grotesquely on occasion. 
First, many scholars may have a problem with the misleadingly simple rationality we use in 
economics. “But the very fact”, said Hayek (1933: 128), “that economic thinking consists 
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merely of ordinary reasoning from commonly known facts––but carried beyond the point at 
which it is immediately obvious […]––makes it difficult for the non-economist to believe 
that economics can teach him anything.” As economists assume global consistency of 
behaviour, one can be stricken by the simplicity of such a way of thinking. This is what 
transpires in many critiques of political economy. It is too simple. It bypasses the more 
complex questions we should consider. This simplicity, however, is an illusion. One who 
refuses to think like an economist will likely misses some key points, even if one is an 
illustrious philosopher. For instance, Rawls thought that both capitalism and socialism were 
compatible with his theory of justice, for they both permit people to exercise and develop his 
or her conception of the good. Hence, he said that his theory is indifferent between these two 
economic systems (1993: 298; 2001: 112f). Political economists cannot remain indifferent – 
market capitalism makes everyone better-off, and leads to more want-satisfaction than a non-
market system. This, in turn, will affect the ways in which people can pursue their 
conception of the good. Sandel (2013b: 29f) may very well criticize Mankiw for defending 
capitalism as a system that maximizes “the economic well-being of everyone in society”, but 
such a simple observation will likely have far-reaching implications for any theory of justice. 
Second, when criticizing economists, it is common to only criticize the conclusions some 
economists have advanced. The usual suspects are neoclassical economists advocating for 
market capitalism. Rather than engaging with their arguments, then, it is tempting to simply 
write off the whole profession. It is a shorthand for engaging seriously with the ideas of 
some economists. Such a trend can be observed in the critiques of so-called “neoliberalism”, 
which are now running rampant. According to Anthony Giddens (1998: 8-14), neoliberals 
advocate for unfettered market forces, and, Joseph Stiglitz (2009) added, they are “market 
fundamentalists”. Yet no one really advocates for such an unfettered system, save perhaps 
for market anarchists, and, even then, the anarcho-capitalism defended by, say, David 
Friedman is often misrepresented beyond recognition. As Hayek explained, the problem with 
economics is that it makes it harder to reach some conclusions. Hence, it becomes tempting 
for the people who want to reach these conclusions to disparage economic thinking in 
general, so not to have to engage with the ideas they disapprove of. 
Third, and perhaps more generally, the unethical trend of economic thinking is mostly 
fictitious. Most economists engage with moral issues on a daily basis, though, of course, not 
in the same way as most philosophers. These issues do not arise out of one’s reading of 
Plato, but rather of one’s policy proposals regarding some maximand one has chosen. The 
immorality of the economist has been greatly exaggerated. Even Bernard Mandeville could 
only praise vice if it is “by Justice lopt and bound” (1989: 76). Economics is not a depraved 
science. We should not underestimate the central role played by considerations of justice. 
In conclusion, this paper has shown how the usual critiques of political economy coming 
from some philosophers are unconvincing. Economics, we could say, is lopt and bound by 
contemporary ethical standards. If anything the presumed perils of thinking like an 
economist is more a disagreement with some classical liberal economists, say Hayek, 
Friedman, Buchanan, Stigler, and Becker. Yet, as Hayek noted (1933: 122), “No serious 
attempt has ever been made to show that the great liberal economists were any less 
concerned with the welfare of the poorer classes of society than were their successors.” In 
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fact, I have shown elsewhere
1
 that classical liberals are indeed concerned with the welfare of 
the poor. Many of the critiques of economics unfortunately distract us from engaging with 
the crucial ideas of some neoclassical economists. Let me conclude by giving the final words 
to John Stuart Mill who summarized quite well what should be our answer to our critics: 
“The same persons who cry down Logic will generally warn you against Political 
Economy. It is unfeeling, they will tell you. It recognises unpleasant facts. For my 
part, the most unfeeling thing I know of is the law of gravitation: it breaks the neck 
of the best and most amiable person without scruple, if he forgets for a single 
moment to give heed to it. The winds and waves too are very unfeeling. Would you 
advise those who go to sea to deny the winds and waves—or to make use of them, 
and find the means of guarding against their dangers? My advice to you is to study 
the great writers on Political Economy, and hold firmly by whatever in them you 
find true; and depend upon it that if you are not selfish or hardhearted already, 
Political Economy will not make you so.” (1867: 70) 
The perils of thinking like an economist are mostly fictitious, though, as Mill reminds us, the 
perils of not thinking like economist are quite real and possibly fatal for a civilization. 
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